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Do Institutional Investors Exploit Market Anomalies?
New Evidence from Alternative Mutual Funds
Abstract
This paper investigates the anomaly trading behavior of a sample of mutual funds mim-
icking hedge fund strategies, namely alternativemutual funds (AMFs), based on both of their
long and short equity positions. We document that AMFs trade on anomalies by buying un-
derpriced stocks and short-selling overpriced peers. While AMFs’ buys and sells based on
their long positions do not generate superior performance, their short-selling and cover-
ing activity based on their short positions significantly negatively predicts future abnormal
returns. However, this predictability is mainly attributed to size and the nine anomaly char-
acteristics considered. Overall, the results suggest that AMFs are sophisticated investors and
that their short positions are more informative relative to their long positions.
Keywords: Alternativemutual funds, market anomaly, long/short positions, short sell, sophis-
ticated investor.
1 Introduction
Whether institutional investors can exploit stockmarket anomalies is a question of long-standing
interest to academics. While institutional investors are generally perceived to be sophisticated,
there is mixed evidence on whether they can exploit the cross-sectional predictability of stock
returns. For instance, Lewellen (2011) shows that institutions fail to tilt their portfolios to take
advantage of thewell-known stock return anomalies. Edelen, Ince, and Kadlec (2016) further doc-
ument that institutions as a whole trade against anomalies and thus contribute to cross-sectional
mispricing. However, Akbas, Armstrong, Sorescu, and Subrahmanyam (2015) suggest that while
mutual funds appear to exacerbate mispricing, hedge funds tend to correct it. The latter result is
confirmed by Calluzzo, Moneta, and Topaloglu (2017) who examine the long side of hedge fund
trades.
It is worth noting that previous studies have examined the trading behavior of institutional
investorsmostly based on their long-side portfolio holdings due to data availability. Mutual funds
typically undertake long-only positions. Although hedge funds can freely use various alternative
strategies involving a combination of leverage and long/short positions, their short positions
are not publicly available because they are generally not registered with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and thus are exempt from the disclosure regulations to which more
traditional institutional investors (such as mutual funds) must adhere.
The focus of the existing literature on institutional investors’ long positions, however, likely
understates their ability to exploit market anomalies, given that asset pricing theories have long
established that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing due to limits to arbi-
trage. For instance, Miller (1977) argues that asset prices should reflect the views of optimists
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rather than those of pessimists due to impediments to short sales. Consistent with this view, the
empirical studies document that market anomalies derive their profitability mainly from sell-
ing short overpriced stocks rather than buying underpriced ones [e.g., Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan
(2012, 2015); Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2013)].
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence to shed light on the long-standing debate
over whether institutional investors can exploit market anomalies by investigating the anomaly
trading behavior of a sample of so-called alternative mutual funds (AMFs henceforth, also com-
monly referred to as hedgedmutual funds), based onboth of their long and short equity positions.
Unlike traditional long-onlymutual funds, AMFs can use hedge-fund-like strategies such as short
selling. However, unlike hedge funds, they are still subject to the same regulations as traditional
mutual funds and thus are required by the SEC to report complete portfolio holdings (including
short positions) on a regular basis.
We focus on AMFs for several reasons. First and foremost, given the availability of their short
positions, AMFs provide a unique setting to study the anomaly trading skills of institutional in-
vestors. As discussed previously, market anomalies extract their profitability mainly from short-
selling overpriced stocks [e.g., Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2015); Avramov et al. (2013)]. As a result,
short positions are likely to provide additional insignts into the investors’ anomaly trading ability,
which otherwise would not have been captured by long positions alone.
Second, AMFs have played an increasingly important role in the field of investment man-
agement in recent years. According to Investment Company Institute 2017 Fact Book, the total
number of AMFs has increased from181 to 478 over the period of 2007-2016; the total assets under
management by AMFs have also increased from $42 billion to $213 billion during this period. It is
believed that the AMF sector will continue to grow because AMFs “provide access to hedge-fund-
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like strategies with the fee structure, liquidity, and regulatory requirements of mutual funds”
[Agarwal, Boyson, and Naik (2009), p.g. 274]. Our research aims to investigate the sources of per-
formance for AMFs and see if they can explore potential market mispricing on the long as well as
the short side.
Finally, Agarwal et al. (2009) show that about half of AMFs have managers with hedge fund
experience. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that one could infer hedge funds’ trading
strategies from AMFs’ trading behavior, to the extent that managers manage AMFs and hedge
funds in a similar way. The short positions of AMFs are particularly informative considering that
the same positions of hedge funds are typically undisclosed trading secrets.
We mainly address three questions in this paper: (1) Can AMFs exploit the cross-sectional
predictability of stock returns? (2) Does their anomaly trading predict future abnormal returns?
(3) Is the predictability due to AMFs’ ability to interpret public information or their possession of
private information? Note that our analysis centers around the sophisticated investor hypothesis
(SIH). Under the SIH, if AMFs are sophisticated investors, we expect them to buy underpriced
stocks and short-sell overpriced ones. In addition, the SIH asserts that AMFs’ trades should be
non-negatively related to future anomaly returns. However, the SIH does not require that AMFs
possess private information.
Using a sample of 415 equity-focused AMFs from Morningstar during 2002–2016, we first ex-
amine whether AMFs trade according to anomaly prescriptions based on their long and short
equity positions separately. We measure AMFs’ trading activity mainly by changes in the frac-
tion of AMFs with outstanding long or short positions in a given stock over a six-quarter trading
window prior to the anomaly portfolio formation date. Consistent with the SIH, the results show
that AMFs as a whole tend to trade in the "right" direction implied by stock market anomalies.
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Specifically, the average fund exhibits a propensity to buy (short sell) underpriced (overpriced)
stocks based on the nine anomalies considered in the paper. Our findings are contrary to those of
prior studies that institutional investors trade on the "wrong" side of anomalies and that mutual
funds’ trades exacerbate stock market anomalies [Edelen et al. (2016); Akbas et al. (2015)].
We next investigate whether AMFs’ anomaly trading leads to positive future abnormal re-
turns. The results indicate that AMFs as a group seem to earn positive abnormal returns from
their buys in underpriced stocks, which, however, are at least partially offset by negative abnor-
mal returns generated from the overpriced stocks they buy. Therefore, based on their long equity
positions, we donot find compelling evidence that AMFs’ buys and sells are related to superior ab-
normal returns. In contrast, anomaly stocks sold short by AMFs underperform those they cover
for both the underpriced and overpriced groups across all individual anomalies. On average, the
difference in Fama and French (1993) three-factor alpha between the stocks sold short and cov-
ered by AMFs is -4.37% (-4.96%) annually for the underpriced (overpriced) groupwith a t-statistic
of -2.09 (-2.53). Thus, based on their short positions, we again document evidence supportive of
the SIH that AMFs in aggregate earn significantly positive abnormal returns in anomaly stocks
they short-sell and cover. These results suggest that short positions are more informative than
long positions. Therefore, previous studies that only focus on the long positions of institutional
investors are likely to understate their anomaly trading ability.
Finally, we show that the change in the fraction of AMFs with long positions in a stock has
negative predictive power for future stock returns, but this predictability is largely driven by
the funds’ preferences for large cap stocks. More importantly, we document the change in the
fraction of AMFs with short positions also significantly negatively predicts future stock returns,
indicating that the increasing number of AMFs that short-sell a stock signals lower future re-
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turns. However, this predictability can be attributed to size and the nine anomaly characteristics
considered, suggesting that AMFs’ short selling and covering activity do not contain additional
private information beyond what is contained in those characteristics.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we provide new insights
into the literature as to whether institutional investors can take advantage of market anoma-
lies. Existing research provides mixed evidence on whether traditional mutual funds can exploit
individual stock market anomalies, such as momentum [Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995)],
accrual [Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008)], and post earnings announcement drift [Ali, Chen, Yao,
and Yu (2009)]. Several recent studies [e.g., Lewellen (2011) and Edelen et al. (2016)] show that
institutional investors as a whole (mutual funds in particular) indeed trade against well-known
stock anomalies. Akbas et al. (2015) and Calluzzo et al. (2017) show that hedge funds can instead
correct mispricing. Unlike previous studies that investigate the anomaly trading behavior of in-
stitutional investors only based on their long positions, we are the first to examine both of the
long and short positions of a subgroup of institutional investors, namely AMFs, and show that
they can trade on market anomalies not only by buying underpriced stocks, but more impor-
tantly, also by short-selling overpriced stocks.
This paper is also part of the growing literature on the performance of AMFs. Agarwal et al.
(2009) show that AMFs outperform traditional mutual funds and underperform hedge funds.
Chen, Desai, and Krishnamurthy (2013) show that mutual funds that use short sales generate
abnormal returns from their long and short positions. Huang and Wang (2013) document that
AMFs provide values to investors especially during financial crisis and their short positions gen-
erate alpha. Our paper supplements prior studies by providing further evidence that anomaly
trading could be one of the primary sources of performance for AMFs. Specifically, we docu-
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ment that AMFs’ short-selling and covering activity predicts future abnormal returns, and this
predictability is mainly attributed to size and the nine anomaly characteristics considered.
Finally, our study is closely related to the literature on short selling. Several studies have
examined short sellers’ trading on anomalies. For instance, Hwang and Liu (2014) study which
market anomalies short arbitragersmight prefer. WuandZhang (2015) examinehow the anomaly
trading behavior of short sellers has changed over time. While these studies focus on short sellers
in general, we focus on a particular group of institutional investors that use short sales, namely
AMFs, and examine how they trade on anomalies based on both of their long and short positions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables used.
Section 3 presents our main empirical findings on the anomaly trading behavior of AMFs and its
return predictability. Section 4 provides several robustness tests. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Data and variable definitions
2.1 Data
We collect data from several sources in this paper. First, our data on AMFs are obtained from
Morningstar, which provides holdings and characteristics information for both live and defunct
funds. Unlike the Thomson database that only reports mutual funds’ long positions in U.S. do-
mestic equities, Morningstar provides both long and short equity positions, and thus enables us
to study both the long and short sides ofmutual fund trading. Note thatmost previous studies on
the trading behavior of mutual funds or other institutional investors, particularly those related
to stock market anomalies, focus on the long side exclusively.
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We also obtain the data on stock returns, market capitalization, trading volume, and other
stock characteristics from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and the accounting
data used to construct stock market anomaly variables from Compustat annual and quarterly
files. Following the conventions in the literature, we include all common stocks (CRSP share code
of 10 or 11) traded onNYSE, Amex, andNASDAQ, and then excludefinancials (CRSP SICCDbetween
6000 and 6999), utilities (CRSP SICCD between 4000 and 4999), and stockswith prices under $5. We
also adjust monthly stock returns for delistings to avoid survivorship bias, following Shumway
(1997). Finally, we download monthly series of market, size, value, and momentum factors and
the risk-free rates from Kenneth French’s online data library.1
To construct our sample of AMFs, we start with all mutual funds that are classified as Alter-
native under Morningstar Category Group. The initial sample contains 893 unique AMFs. We
further keep only the funds that are identified as Long-short Equity, Market Neutral, Multialter-
natve, 130–30, and BearMarket underMorningstar Category. According toMorningstar Category
Classifications, funds in the five categories are likely to trade on U.S. equities, which we confirm
in the data.2 This gives us a refined sample of equity-based AMFs, for which we collect data on
quarterly holdings and fund characteristics over the period from 1984Q1 to 2016Q4 from Morn-
ingstar. Lastly, wemerge the sample funds’ domestic equity holdingswith the stock data obtained
from the CRSP/Compustat database using CUSIPs and tickers.
Overall, our final sample includes 415 AMFs, among which 410 (319) have long (short) posi-
tions in U.S. domestic stocks. The funds trade a total of 5947 unique stocks during the sample
period, of which 5785 (4273) are held long (sold short). Fig. 1 plots the numbers of funds and
1Kenneth French’s data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html.
2The Morningstar category methodology documentation is available at http://advisor.morningstar.com/
Enterprise/VTC/MorningstarCategoryClassificationEffectiveApril2017.pdf.
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stocks held over time. From Panel A, we can see that the total number of funds increases from 2
in 1984 to 230 in 2016. The vast majority of the funds hold long positions in U.S. equities, whereas
about 77% (319) of the sample funds have short positions. Panel B depicts the number of stocks
held in the aggregate portfolio of AMFs. The total number of traded stocks increases from 52 to
2000 during the sample period. The dashed red line shows that the funds barely hold any short
positions prior to 2002. From 2002 to 2016, the number of shorted stocks rises from 203 to 1668.
As the sample contains few funds and almost no short holdings before 2002Q1, we use the period
from 2002Q1 to 2016Q4 as the main sample for our analysis.
2.2 Variable definitions
We define the variables used in our analysis in this subsection. Stambaugh et al. (2012) exam-
ine eleven well-documented stock market anomalies and classify them into nine categories. To
avoid redundancy, we employ one anomaly from each of the nine categories. The nine anomalies
studied in our paper are defined as follows.
1. Total accruals (ACC) – the change in net working capital minus depreciation scaled by average
total assets for the previous two fiscal years [Sloan (1996)].
2. Asset growth (AG) – the growth rate of firm’s total assets in the previous fiscal year [Cooper,
Gulen, and Schill (2008)].
3. Gross profitability (GP) – gross profits divided by total assets [Novy-Marx (2013)].
4. Investment to assets (ITA) – the change in gross property, plant, and equipment plus changes
in inventory scaled by lagged total assets [Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2007)].
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5. Momentum (MOM) – the continuously compounded return frommonth t-13 to month t-2 [Je-
gadeesh and Titman (1993)].3
6. Net operating assets (NOA) – the difference between operating assets and operating liabilities
divided by total assets in the previous fiscal year [Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004)].
7. Net stock issuance (NSI) – the natural log of one plus the growth rate of split-adjusted shares
outstanding in the previous fiscal year [Pontiff andWoodgate (2008); Fama and French (2008)].
8. Ohlson O-score (OSC) – the probability of bankruptcy in a static model using accounting vari-
ables, such as net income divided by assets, working capital divided by market assets, and
current liability divided by current assets [Ohlson (1980)].
9. Return on asset (ROA) – the income before extraordinary items divided by one-quarter-lagged
total assets [Chen, Novy-Marx, andZhang (2011); FamaandFrench (2006);Wang andYu (2013)].
Note that six out of the nine anomalies, ACC, AG, GP, ITA, NOA, and NSI, are updated annually
due to the availability of accounting data. For these anomalies, we form value-weighted anomaly
portfolios at the end of June each year and hold the portfolios for 12months, from July of year t to
June of year t+1. The remaining three anomalies, MOM, OSC, and ROA, are updated every quarter
using the Compustat quarterly files and then held for a quarter. To ensure the accounting data
are publicly available, we skip one quarter when forming value-weighted anomaly portfolios for
OSC and ROA.
We next define trading measures. As our main interest is in AMFs’ trading behavior in stock
market anomalies, we focus on how the funds as a group adjust their long and short positions
3We skip month t-1 to control for potential short-term reversal [see, e.g., Jegadeesh (1990); Lehmann (1990)].
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separately in anomaly stocks as the characteristics of the underlying stocks vary over time. We
consider two measures of trading. The first (and primary) measure is defined as the change in
number of AMFswith anoutstanding long or short position in a given stockdivided by the average
number of AMFs holding stocks in the same market capitalization decile as of the beginning of
the trading window. For brevity, we refer to this measure as the change in fraction of AMFs and
label it as ∆%Fund, henceforth. This measure is similar to the change in ownership breadth in
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002). The second measure is the change in the fraction of a company’s
outstanding shares held long or sold short by AMFs. We call this trading measure the change
in fraction of shares and label it as ∆%Shr. We employ ∆%Fund as our main trading measure
for two reasons. First, unlike∆%Shr,∆%Fund is immune to the large trades of a few funds as it
places equal weight on each fund. Second,∆%Fund only tracks initiated and closed positions in
a stock, whichmay better reflect the funds’ active andmost recent investment ideas and thus are
more likely to be motivated by the managers’ opinions on mispricing in the underlying stocks.
In contrast, ∆%Shr tracks changes in existing positions in a stock as well. Such trades tend to
be less informative about the future performance of the underlying stocks, because a fund could
passively increase or decrease existing positions in its holding stocks in response to cash inflows
or outflows [see, e.g., Coval and Stafford (2007); Lou (2012)]. We consider the six-, four-, two-, and
one-quarter trading windows prior to the anomaly portfolio formation date. Following Edelen
et al. (2016), we adopt the six-quarter trading window, which covers the realization of anomaly
ranking variables and ends three months after the full public disclosure of annual 10-k, as the
primary one in this paper. The results based on the other windows are similar in direction.
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3 Empirical results
We present our main empirical findings in this section. First, we report the properties of the
nine stock market anomalies studied in the paper. We then discuss the characteristics of our
sample AMFs as well as the stocks held long and sold short by these funds. Next, we present the
main results on AMFs’ trading activity in anomalies and their anomaly trading performance. We
also explore AMFs’ trading preferences for stocks characteristics other than the nine anomaly
characteristics. Finally, we investigate the predictive ability of AMFs’ trading activity for future
stock returns.
3.1 Properties of stock market anomalies
In this subsection, we examine the properties of the nine stock market anomalies studied in this
paper. Following Stambaugh et al. (2012), we sort stocks into ten decile portfolios based on each
of the nine anomalies, with decile 10 (1) being the best- (worst-) performing decile. We then
compute value-weighted average returns for each decile portfolio in any given month.
Panel A of Table 1 presents, for each anomaly, annualized three-factor alphas (in percentage)
of the long, short, and long-short portfolio strategies, respectively, using all stocks with non-
missing anomaly characteristics in the CRSP universe over the period of 1984 to 2016. The long
(short) leg refers to the best- (worst-) performing decile portfolio and the long-short portfolio is
the long minus the short leg. The last column (AVG) refers to a combination strategy that takes
equal positions across the nine anomaly portfolios.
Several patterns emerge from the table. First, consistent with the findings documented in
previous studies (e.g., Stambaugh et al. (2012)), the alphas of the long-short portfolio strategies
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across the nine anomalies are all positive and statistically significant, with an average of 6.98%
per year (t-statistic=5.04). Second, the abnormal returns on the long-short strategies appear to
be largely derived from stocks in the short legs. Averaged across the nine anomalies, the short
leg generates an annualized alpha of -4.59%, whereas the long leg captures 2.40%. The evidence
suggests that short-selling overpriced anomaly stocks in the short legs is more profitable than
buying theunderpriced in the long legs, in the absence of shorting costs. This asymmetric pattern
is also consistent with the findings reported in Stambaugh et al. (2012).
In Panel B of Table 1, we repeat the analysis using a subset of stocks held by AMFs during
the same sample period. The results exhibit similar patterns: all long-short portfolio strategies
generate positive three-factor alphas with an average of 5.44% per year (t-statistic=4.30) and the
magnitude of the short alpha is larger than that of the long alpha (3.28% vs. 2.16%). Interestingly,
the average alpha across the nine long-short portfolios (5.44%) based on stocks held by AMFs is
smaller than that (6.98%) based on the CRSP stocks. A closer examination shows that the differ-
ence is mainly attributed to the difference in the short alphas. Overall, the results indicate that
compared with the CRSP sample, the subset of stocks held by AMFs appears to be less mispriced.
Panel C of Table 1 presents pair-wise correlations among the long-short benchmark-adjusted
returns of the nine anomalies. We follow Stambaugh et al. (2012) to compute the benchmark-
adjusted returns as the sum of the intercept and the residuals from the regression of a long-short
strategy’s monthly excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The general
observation is that the anomalies are not strongly related to each other. The pair-wise corre-
lation coefficients range from -0.17 to 0.41, with an average of 0.15 across the nine anomalies
(t-statistic=1.07). The correlation results suggest that the anomaly characteristics are relatively
distinct from each other and that our results on AMFs’ trading on particular anomalies are less
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likely driven by their trading on other anomalies.
3.2 Characteristics of alternative mutual funds and stocks held
We describe the characteristics of AMFs in our sample and the stocks held by these funds during
our main sample period of 2002–2016 in this subsection. Panel A of Table 2 provides summary
statistics of fund characteristics, including total net assets (TNA), fund age, turnover ratio, and
expense ratio. Our sample AMFs have an average TNA of $245.38 million with a standard devia-
tion of $623.17 million. The sample tends to be skewed towards small funds, as evidenced by a
median TNA of $41 million. These funds are relatively young with an average age of 6.7 years.
The mean (median) turnover ratio is 297.83% (182.47%), indicating that these funds are highly
actively managed. The average annual expense ratio of the sample funds is 1.95% per year (me-
dian=1.90%), which appears to be higher than that of traditional mutual funds (1.30%).
We next compare the characteristics of stocks held by AMFs with those of a benchmark port-
folio. As AMFs hold both long and short stock positions, we sort all stocks held into two portfolios:
the long portfolio that contains stocks with outstanding long positions, and the short portfolio
including stocks with outstanding short positions. For the purpose of comparison, we also con-
struct a benchmark portfolio (labelled as “the CRSP portfolio”) using all stocks with non-missing
characteristics in the CRSP database. Following Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), we calcu-
late the characteristic rank score for each stock as the stock’s decile rank on the characteristic
relative to all stocks in the CRSP portfolio, with decile 10 (1) being the best- (worst-) performing
stocks. Thus, the portfolio-level characteristic rank score is the market-capitalization weighted
average rank score of all stocks held in the portfolio. Note that despite the rank score for a stock
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is calculated at the end of June each year for annually updated anomalies and at the end of each
quarter for quarterly updated anomalies, the portfolio rank scores are computed each quarter
based on quarterly holdings.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the rank scores on 11 stock characteristics (book-to-market ratio
(BM), size, and the nine anomalies studied in our paper) as well as an average score (labelled as
“AVG”) across the 11 characteristics for the long, short, and CRSP portfolios, respectively. Com-
paring the characteristic rank scores of the long and CRSP portfolios (Column “(2)-(1)”), we show
that the longportfolio has higher rank scores than theCRSPportfolio for all characteristics except
AG, BM, and SIZE. On average, the difference between these twoportfolios is 0.15 (t-statistic=9.80),
indicating that AMFs as a group tend to hold long positions in underpriced (i.e., better perform-
ing) anomaly stocks. From the comparison between the short and CRSP portfolios (Column “(3)-
(1)”), we can see that the differences in rank scores are significantly negative for AG, BM, ITA,
MOM, ROA, and SIZE. For ACC, GP, NOA, NSI, and OSC, the differences are marginally positive and
statistically insignificant. The short portfolio has an average rank score that is 0.12 lower than the
benchmark portfolio, suggesting that AMFs tend to short overpriced anomaly stocks. Finally, the
comparison between the long and short portfolios (Column “(2)-(3)”) shows that the rank scores
of the long portfolio are all significantly higher than those of the short portfolio except for AG
and SIZE, with an average difference of 0.28 (t-statistic=11.22). Overall, the results suggest that,
on average, AMFs as a whole have a propensity to hold long (short) positions in under- (over-)
priced anomaly stocks. In other words, AMFs exhibit preferences for stock characteristics in a
way that follows anomaly prescriptions.4
4Note that the characteristic rank score is calculated based on the levels of holdings, which reflect AMFs’ per-
sistent demand for stocks with certain characteristics, rather than the changes in holdings, which more accurately
measure AMFs’ trading activity. Our paper focuses more on the latter.
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3.3 Anomaly trading
In this subsection, we explore whether AMFs trade on the nine stock market anomalies. Re-
call that we split stocks held by AMFs into the long and short portfolios based on their out-
standing positions. Within each portfolio, we compute, for a given stock, the annualized change
in the fraction of funds with outstanding positions in the stock (∆%Fund) and the annualized
change in the fraction of shares held (∆%Shr) during the anomaly portfolio formation window.
We then separately examine AMF’s trading activity based on their long and short portfolios.
The sign of the trading variable implies the direction of trade. For stocks in the long portfo-
lio, ∆%Fund>0 (∆%Fund<0) indicates buying (selling) activity; for stocks in the short portfolio,
∆%Fund>0 (∆%Fund<0) is a sign of short-selling (covering). ∆%Shr shares the same implications.
Table 3 presents the results on AMFs’ trading activity across the nine anomalies. For each
anomaly, we classify the stocks held by all sample funds into underpriced, neutral, and overpriced
groups. The underpriced (overpriced) group contains the 30% best- (worst-) performing stocks
related to the anomaly, and the neutral group includes themiddle 40% stocks.5 The neutral group
serves as a benchmark for evaluating AMFs’ trading on overpriced and underpriced stocks. We
report the average fund’s buying/selling and short-selling/covering activities in each of the three
groups based on AMFs’ long and short equity positions in Panels A and B, respectively. In both
panels, we also compute the fund’s average trading activity across the nine anomalies in the last
set of columns labelled as “AVG”. In the rest of this section, our discussion focuses on our main
trading variable – the change in the fraction of funds (∆%Fund) based on a trading window of six
quarters prior to the anomaly portfolio formation date.6
5In unreported results, we also consider an alternative classification based on 20%-60%-20% and find qualitatively
similar results.
6The results based on the tradingwindow of one, two, or four quarters are similar. Also note that the results based
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We first discuss the results based on AMF’s long equity positions. If AMFs are sophisticated
investors, they are expected to exhibit the ability to exploit anomaly-implied mispricing by buy-
ing underpriced stocks, i.e., the stocks in the long leg of an anomaly. Thus, one would expect to
observe a higher (lower) level of buying activity in the underpriced (overpriced) group, relative
to the neutral group.
The results in Panel A of Table 3 appear to support this prediction: for all of the nine anoma-
lies, with the exception of AG, GP, and NSI, the increases in ∆%Fund for stocks in the under-
priced (overpriced) group are significantly greater (less) than in the neutral group. On average,
the difference in∆%Fund between the underpriced (overpriced) and neutral portfolios is 4.19%
(-4.06%) with a t-statistic of 4.33 (-4.36). The results suggest that based on their long equity po-
sitions, AMFs in aggregate tend to trade on stocks following anomaly predictions. It is worth
noting that our sample funds seem to trade extensively on momentum. For example, the differ-
ence in∆%Fund between the underpriced and overpriced groups is 27.15%, which is substantially
greater than the average of 8.24% across the nine anomalies. This result is consistent with insti-
tutional investors’ return chasing behavior documented in the literature [Grinblatt et al. (1995);
Wermers (1999); Badrinath and Wahal (2002); Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006); Sias (2007)].
We then present the results based on AMFs’ short equity positions. Unlike traditional mu-
tual funds, AMFs could also take advantage of the mispricing by short-selling overpriced stocks,
i.e., the stocks in the short leg of an anomaly. It is well documented in the literature that the
short positions in the short-leg anomaly portfolio are more profitable than the long positions in
the long leg (See, e.g., Stambaugh et al. (2012)). Therefore, if AMFs as a group intend to trade
on anomalies, particularly by short-selling the overpriced stocks, one should observe relatively
on the change in fraction of shares (∆%Shr) are similar, particularly in the case of AMF’s short equity positions.
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higher (lower) short-selling activity in the overpriced (underpriced) group as compared to the
neutral group.
The evidence in Panel B of Table 3 is largely in support of this prediction. First, we note that
the changes in the fraction of funds (∆%Fund) are all positive across the nine anomalies, indi-
cating the increasing number of funds short-selling the stocks over the sample period. Second,
comparing the changes across the three stock groups, we can see that the increases in∆%Fund
for stocks in the overpriced group are greater than the increases in the neutral group for all the
nine anomalies by an average of 8.34% (t-statistic=8.15). This result indicates that AMFs have
stronger intention to short-sell overpriced stocks implied by anomalies relative to the neutral
peers. Third, the difference in ∆%Fund between the underpriced and neutral groups, averaged
across the nine anomalies, is 1.41% (t-statistic=-3.17), which is also consistent with anomaly pre-
scriptions. Last, the comparison between the underpriced and overpriced groups indicates that
the levels of short-selling activity in underpriced stocks are all economically and statistically
significantly lower than the levels in overpriced stocks, with an average difference of -9.76% (t-
statistic=-7.89). Overall, the results based on AMFs’ short equity positions suggest that AMFs
appear to exhibit strong interests in short-selling the overpriced stocks implied by stock market
anomalies.
In summary, the results show that consistent with the sophisticated investor hypothesis,
AMFs as awhole tend to trade in the “right” direction implied by stockmarket anomalies. Specifi-
cally, the average fund exhibits a propensity to buy underpriced stocks and short-sell overpriced
peers. Our findings are contrary to those of prior studies that institutional investors trade on
the "wrong side" of anomalies and that mutual funds’ trades exacerbate stock market anomalies
[Frazzini and Lamont (2008); Akbas et al. (2015)]. It is, however, worth pointing out that our find-
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ings are based on AMFs – a subgroup of institutional investors who can adopt hedge-fund-like
strategies such as short selling while being subject to the same regulations as traditional mutual
funds, which differ from the samples examined in other studies, such as traditional mutual funds
or institutional investors in general.
3.4 Anomaly trading performance
In this subsection, we explore whether AMFs’ anomaly trading leads to future positive abnormal
returns. Again we sort stocks held by AMFs into the long and short portfolios based on their
outstanding positions. Within each portfolio, we further sort stocks into sub-portfolios based on
anomaly characteristics and ∆%Fund. Specifically, on each anomaly portfolio formation date,
we rank stocks into sub-portfolios by the anomaly variable: the underpriced (overpriced) group
which contains the top (bottom) 30% best- (worst-) performing stocks, and the neutral onewhich
includes the middle 40% stocks. We also sort stocks into quintile portfolios based on ∆%Fund
over the six quarters prior to the anomaly portfolio formation date. Note that we refer to the top
(bottom) 20% of∆%Fund as buy (sell) for the long portfolio and as short-sell (cover) for the short
portfolio. For both the long and short portfolios, we then form four value-weighted anomaly
portfolios conditional on AMFs’ trading by taking the intersection of the underpriced and over-
priced groups for each anomaly with the top and bottom quintiles of∆%Fund.
Table 4 reports the annualized three-factor alphas of each of the four conditional anomaly
portfolios as well as the differences in alphas between the top and bottom∆%Fund quintiles, i.e.,
Buy – Sell and Short-sell – Cover, for stocks held long and sold short by AMFs, respectively, in
Panels A and B. In each panel, we report the results for each of the nine anomalies. We also form
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four aggregate conditional anomaly portfolios that take equal-weighted positions across the nine
anomalies and report their performance in the last section (AVG). According to the sophisticated
investor hypothesis, one would expect to observe a positive relation between AMFs’ trades and
future anomaly returns. In other words, based on AMF’s long (short) stock positions, anomaly
stocks that AMFs buy (short-sell) should outperform (underperform) those they sell (cover).
We first focus on the results for the long portfolio in Panel A of Table 4. Across the nine
anomalies, the stocks AMFs buy outperform those they sell for five out of the nine anomalies
in both the underpriced and overpriced groups. However, only among the underpriced stocks
implied by NOA is the difference in alphas statistically significant (t=1.98). On average, AMFs in
aggregate earn an abnormal return of 3.15% per year (t-statistic=1.96) from the anomaly-implied
underpriced stocks they buy. Meanwhile, they also sell stocks classified as underpriced, which
generate an average annual alpha of 2.37% (t-statistic=1.55). The spread in alpha is therefore not
statistically different from zero. Turning to the overpriced group, we can see that AMFs’ aggre-
gate trades are somewhat value-destroying: the overpriced stocks they buy on average earn an
annual alpha of -1.31%, though statistically insignificant. Overall, the results indicate that AMFs
as a group seem to earn positive abnormal returns from their buys in underpriced stocks. How-
ever, the returns are partially offset by negative abnormal returns generated from the overpriced
stocks they buy. Therefore, we do not find compelling evidence that AMFs’ buys and sells are re-
lated to superior abnormal returns based on their long stock positions.
We next discuss the results for the short portfolio in Panel B of Table 4. The table shows that
anomaly stocks sold short by AMFs underperform those they cover for both the underpriced
and overpriced groups across all of the nine anomalies, with the exception of the overpriced
group implied by GP. On average, the spreads in three-factor alpha between the stocks sold short
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and those covered by AMFs are economically large and statistically significant: -4.37% (-4.96%)
annually for the underpriced (overpriced) group with a t-statistic of -2.09 (-2.53). The results
suggest that based on their short stock positions, AMFs in aggregate earn significantly positive
abnormal returns in anomaly stocks they short sell and cover.
Overall, in sharp contrast to the results for the long portfolio, those based on the short portfo-
lio provide strong support for the sophisticated investor hypothesis. In particular, the evidence
indicates that while AMFs’ buys and sells do not earn abnormal anomaly returns, their short-
selling and covering activity appear to generate superior future abnormal anomaly returns.
3.5 Characteristics of conditional anomaly portfolios
To shed further light on the trading behavior of AMFs, we explore whether AMFs as a whole
exhibit other trading preferences besides the nine anomaly characteristics studied in this paper.
Specifically, we examine five characteristics for the four conditional anomaly portfolios within
each of the long and short portfolios as constructed in the previous subsection: the number of
constituent stocks (%NSTOCKS),market capitalization (MKTCAP), book-to-market (BM), turnover
(TURN), and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL).
Table 5 reports the mean values across the nine anomalies for each of the five characteristics
based on stocks held long and sold short by AMFs in Panels A and B, respectively. The first set
of columns (%NSTOCKS) shows the average number of stocks in each portfolio divided by the
total number of stocks included in all four portfolios. From Panel A, based on their long stock
positions, AMFs exhibit significantly higher buying activity than selling for both underpriced
and overpriced stocks, although the difference is much larger for underpriced stocks compared
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to overpriced ones (16.57% vs. 4.87%). Based on stocks with short positions in Panel B, we can
see that, within the underpriced group, the number of stocks sold short by AMFs does not differ
significantly from the number of stocks covered. In contrast, for the overpriced group, the stocks
AMFs short sell are significantly more than those they cover (34.56% vs. 18.30%), indicatingmore
intensive short-selling activity of overpriced stocks implied by the anomalies.
The second set of columns (MKTCAP) summarizes the average market capitalization of con-
stituent stocks of the four conditional anomaly portfolios. Panel A shows that, based on their
long positions, AMFs clearly have a strong preference to buy large cap stocks and to sell small
cap ones. The differences in MKTCAP between stocks bought and sold by AMFs are economi-
cally large and statistically significant for both underpriced and overpriced groups. This result
is in line with the preference for large cap stocks that has been found in mutual funds and in-
stitutional investors in general [Falkenstein (1996); Gompers and Metrick (2001); Yan and Zhang
(2007)]. Based on their short positions (Panel B), AMFs show a propensity to short-sell small cap
stocks and to cover large cap stocks, particularly in the overpriced group.
The third set of columns (BM) shows the average book-to-market ratios. Based on their long
stock positions (Panel A), AMFs do not seem to take into account BM particularly in buying and
selling underpriced stocks. This result differs from previous finding that institutional investors
show a strong preference for high BM stocks [See, e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)]. On the
other hand, Panel B shows that the stocks sold short in both overpriced and underpriced groups,
on average, have a significantly lower BM than those they cover, suggesting that AMFs have a
systematic preference to short-sell low BM (i.e., growth) stocks and to cover those with high BM
(i.e., value stocks).
The fourth set of columns (TURN) presents the average monthly turnover ratios. In Panel
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A, we do not find any significant difference in turnover between the Buy and Sell portfolios for
the underpriced group. This result indicates that AMFs do not seem to account for underlying
stock liquidity in buying and selling underpriced stocks, while institutional investors, short-term
in particular, have a strong preference for turnover [Yan and Zhang (2007)]. However, as shown
in Panel B, the average turnover values of the Short-sell portfolios are significantly higher than
those of the Cover portfolios for both underpriced and overpriced groups, implying that stock
liquidity seems to play an important role in AMFs’ short-selling and covering decisions.
In the last set of columns (IVOL), we report the average idiosyncratic volatility for the four
conditional anomaly portfolios. Based on their short position (Panel B), AMFs show a strong
tendency to short-sell (cover) stocks with high (low) idiosyncratic volatility. However, based on
their long positions (Panel A), we do not find such preference in their buying and selling activity.
To summarize, based on their short stock positions, we find strong evidence that AMFs in
aggregate exhibit significant propensity to short sell overpriced, small cap, low book-to-market,
high turnover, and high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. In contrast, based on their long stock
positions, there is little evidence that the funds have preferences for book-to-market, turnover,
or idiosyncratic volatility, especially in their buys and sells of underpriced stocks.
3.6 Alternative mutual funds’ trading and future stock returns
In this subsection, we investigate the relation between AMFs’ trading and future stock returns. In
general, previous studies has documented a positive relation between the levels of and changes
in institutional ownership and future stock returns at the short horizon and attribute the source
of the predictability to an informational advantage [e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001); Yan and
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Zhang (2007)]. On the contrary, Edelen et al. (2016) find a significant negative long-horizon rela-
tion between institutional trading and future stock returns.
Following this line of research, we explore whether AMFs’ trading activity predicts future
stock returns. Specifically, we conduct Fama-MacBeth regressions of futuremonthly stock excess
returns on∆%Fund over the six-, four-, two- or one-quarter tradingwindowprior to the anomaly
portfolio formation date, controlling for firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BM), and the nine
anomaly characteristics. 7
Table 6 reports Fama-MacBeth regression results for all stocks held long and sold short by
AMFs, respectively, in Panels A and B. We first regress monthly stock excess returns on∆%Fund
in Columns (1)–(4). According to the sophisticated investor hypothesis, if AMFs’ trading predicts
future returns, we would expect the coefficients on ∆%Fund to be significantly positive (neg-
ative) for long (shorted) stocks. From Panel A , however, we find no evidence of predictability
for long stocks. The coefficients on ∆%Fund across the four trading windows are all negative
and statistically significant for six and four quarters, indicating the negative predictive power
of AMFs’ buying and selling. This result is indeed consistent with the findings of Edelen et al.
(2016). In contrast, Panel B shows that∆%Fund is negatively related to future stock returns for
shorted stocks, statistically significantly for the six- and one-quarter trading window, indicating
that the increasing number of funds that short a stock signals lower future returns. This result is
consistent with the prediction of sophisticated investor hypothesis.
To further investigate the sources of the predictability, we add SIZE and BM to the regressions
in Columns (5)–(8). Focusing on Panel A, for long stocks, we note that the negative predictive
power of AMFs’ trading disappears, given that the coefficient on∆%Fund(q-6, q-1) becomes sub-
7We add SIZE and BM to the set, as they have been shown to be related to future stock returns.
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stantially lower in magnitude and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the coefficient on SIZE is
-0.13 with a t-statistic of -3.46, indicating that the negative predictive ability of AMFs’ buying and
selling activity is largely driven by their strong trading preference for large cap stocks. This is
also supported by the evidence shown in Table 5 that AMFs tend to buy (sell) stocks with large
(small) market cap. On the other hand, Panel B shows that the predictive power of AMFs’ short-
selling and covering activity still exists (though weakened) after controlling for SIZE and BM: the
coefficient on ∆%Fund(q-6,q-1) is -0.27 (t-statistic=-2.06). We also note that the coefficient on
SIZE is -0.12 with a t-statistic of -2.30. The results suggest that AMFs’ shorting and covering con-
tain predictive information for future returns beyond that derived from size and book-to-market
characteristics.
Finally, in Columns (9)–(12), we further add the nine anomaly characteristics studied in this
paper as control variables. As a result, for long stocks (Panel A), the coefficient on ∆%Fund(q-
6,q-1) is virtually unchanged, confirming that the negative predictive power of AMFs’ buying and
selling for future returns depends exclusively on their adverse exposure towards the size char-
acteristic. For shorted stocks (Panel B), however, the coefficient on ∆%Fund(q-6,q-1) becomes
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the predictive ability of∆%Fund is related to the firm
size and the nine anomaly characteristics.
In general, the results based on AMFs’ long stock positions suggest that AMFs’ buying and
selling have negative predictive power for future stock returns, but this predictability is largely
explained by their preference for large cap stocks. On the contrary, the results based on AMFs’
short stock positions suggest that AMFs’ short-selling and covering activity can predict future
stock returns. However, these activity does not contain additional information beyond what is
contained in size and the nine anomaly characteristics.
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4 Robustness
In the baseline analysis, we show that AMFs in aggregate trade on the “right” side of stockmarket
anomalies, based on either of their long and short equity positions. We also find that while AMFs’
buying and selling activity does not seem to generate alpha, their short-selling and covering ac-
tivity produces superior future abnormal returns. In this section, we perform several robustness
tests. First, we examine whether the results are robust across different fund categories. Second,
we investigate the robustness of the results over time.
4.1 Sub-sample analysis
Recall that our sample consists of five fund categories as classified by Morningstar: Long-short
Equity, Market Neutral, Multialternative, 130–30, and Bear Market. A natural question is then
whether our main results hold for different fund categories. To this end, we repeat our baseline
analysis for individual categories and report the average results across the nine anomalies in
Table 7.
Panel A of Table 7 investigates the anomaly trading behavior of AMFs by fund category. From
the first sub-panel (Panel A1), we can see that based on their long equity positions, the funds in
all categories (except for bear market funds) on average trade in the “right” direction implied
by anomalies, although to different extents.8 For instance, the differences in ∆%Fund between
the underpriced and overpriced groups are 2.57%, 1.87%, 0.79%, and 2.06% with t-statistics of
5.08, 2.83, 2.39, and 3.17, respectively, for Long-short Equity, Market Neutral, Multialternative,
and 130–30. The second sub-panel (Panel A2) shows very similar patterns except for bear market
8The results in Panel A1 for bear market funds are missing due to the lack of data on their long stock positions.
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funds, based on the funds’ short equity positions. For example, for the remaining four fund cat-
egories, the differences in∆%Fund between the underpriced and overpriced groups range from
-0.80 to -3.61, with t-statistics ranging from -2.12 to -8.30.
In Panel B of Table 7, we examine AMFs’ anomaly trading performance for each of the five cat-
egories. In general, the first sub-panel (Panel B1) shows that based on AMFs’ long stock positions,
the stocks the funds buy do not significantly outperform those they sell. The only exception is
that the difference in annualized alpha between the underpriced stocks bought and sold by mar-
ket neutral funds is 4.51% (t-statistics=2.03). The results based on AMFs’ short equity positions in
the second sub-panel (Panel B2) show that anomaly stocks sold short by the funds underperform
those they cover for four (three) out of the five fund categories in the overpriced (underpriced)
group.9 In summary, the results based on individual fund categories largely confirm our baseline
findings.
4.2 Sub-period analysis
To investigate whether our main results are robust over time, we split our full sample into two
sub-periods of 2002:7–2009:6 and 2009:7–2016:12 and repeat the main analysis. Table 8 presents
the results averaged across the nine anomalies on AMFs’ anomaly trading behavior and the per-
formance of anomaly portfolios conditional on their trading, respectively, in Panels A and B, for
both sub-periods. Panel A shows that AMFs exhibit significant preferences for anomaly-implied
mispriced stocks in their trading in both periods. This is consistent with our baseline finding that
AMFs tend to buy underpriced stocks and short-sell overpriced ones. Moreover, their anomaly
9It is worth pointing out that even though the stocks sold short by bear market funds underperform those they
cover in both overpriced and underpriced groups, we do not detect any anomaly trading activity in their trading.
Therefore, the underperformance cannot be attributed to anomaly related trading.
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trading appears to be stronger during the first sub-period, as evidenced by the magnitudes of
the differences in average∆%Fund between the underpriced and overpriced groups (11.79% vs.
5.14% based on AMFs’ long stock positions; -13.60% vs. -7.36% based on their short stock posi-
tions). From Panel B, we can see that AMFs’ buying and selling combined do not produce positive
abnormal returns in both periods. In contrast, their short-selling and covering activity appears
to generate alpha in both periods, as the stocks they short-sell underperform those they cover
in both the underpriced and overpriced groups. Overall, our sub-period analysis confirms the
baseline results of this paper, suggesting that our results are robust over time.
5 Concluding remarks
The existing literature presents mixed evidence on whether institutional investors can trade on
well-known stock market anomalies, mostly based on their long-side portfolio holdings [e.g.,
Lewellen (2011); Akbas et al. (2015); Edelen et al. (2016); Calluzzo et al. (2017)]. However, the
asset pricing literature suggests that overpricing should be more prevalent than underpricing
due to limits to arbitrage [e.g., Miller (1977)] and that market anomalies derive their profitability
mainly from selling short overpriced stocks [e.g., Stambaugh et al. (2012, 2015); Avramov et al.
(2013)]. As a result, using only long-side portfolio holdings may understate the ability of institu-
tional investors, especially thosewho can freely adopt alternative strategies such as short selling,
to exploit market anomalies.
In this paper, we provide new empirical evidence by investigating the anomaly trading be-
havior of a sample of mutual funds mimicking hedge fund strategies, namely alternative mutual
funds (AMFs), based on both of their long and short equity positions. Consistent with the sophis-
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ticated investor hypothesis, the results show that AMFs trade according to anomaly prescriptions
by buying underpriced stocks and selling short overpriced ones. Based on their long positions,
we do not find compelling evidence that AMFs buys and sells are related to superior abnormal
returns. However, based on their short positions, AMFs in aggregate earn significantly positive
abnormal returns in anomaly stocks that they short-sell and cover. Finally, we show that AMF’s
short-selling and covering activity does not contain additional private information in predict-
ing future stock returns, beyond what is contained in size and the nine anomaly characteristics.
Overall, the results indicate that AMFs are sophisticated investors and their short positions are
more informative relative to their long positions.
Our findings have several important implications regarding the role that institutional in-
vestors and limits-of-arbitrage might play in well-known stock market anomalies. In particular,
McLean and Pontiff (2016) document that anomaly returns decline bymore than 50% in the post-
publication period, which largely coincides with our sample period of 2002–2016. Our results
suggest that AMFs are “smart” institutional investors who may play the role of short arbitragers
in correcting cross-sectional mispricing.
Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2009) show that about half of AMFs havemanagers with hedge fund
experience. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that their trading behavior would provide
valuable insight into hedge funds’ trading strategies, to the extent that managers manage AMFs
and hedge funds in a similar way. Although the short positions of hedge funds are typically undis-
closed, one might infer the potential role of hedge funds as short arbitragers in correcting stock
return anomalies based on the disclosed short positions of AMFs.
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Figure 1. The number of alternative mutual funds and stocks held over time
This figure plots the number of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) and the number of stocks held
over time. In Panel A, the black solid line shows the number of AMFs, and the blue dashed and
red dotted lines show the number of AMFs with long and short positions, respectively. In Panel
B, the black solid line depicts the number of stocks held, and the blue dashed and red dotted
lines depict the number of stocks held long and sold short by AMFs, respectively.
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Table 1. Properties of stock market anomalies
This table presents properties of returns for the nine stock market anomalies during the sample period of 1984–2016. Panels A and B report the
annualized three-factor alphas (in percentage) of the long, short, and long-short value-weighted anomaly portfolios based on all stocks with
non-missing anomaly characteristics in the CRSP universe and those held only by alternative mutual funds (AMFs), respectively. The long (short)
leg is the best- (worst-) performing decile portfolio implied by the indicated anomaly, and the long-short portfolio is the difference between the
best- and worst-performing deciles. The last column (AVG) refers to a combination strategy that takes equal positions across the nine anomalies.
Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics. Panel C presents the correlation matrix among the long-short
benchmark-adjusted returns of the nine anomalies. Following Stambaugh et al. (2012), we define the benchmark-adjusted returns as the sum of
the intercept and the residuals from the regression of a long-short strategy’s monthly excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors.
Figures in parentheses are p-values.
Accurals Asset Gross Investment Momentum Net Operating Net Stock O-Score Return AverageGrowth Profitability to Assets Assets Issuance on Assets
(ACC) (AG) (GP) (ITA) (MOM) (NOA) (NSI) (OSC) (ROA) (AVG)
Panel A: CRSP
Long 3.70 0.60 4.16 1.32 -0.12 3.89 2.56 1.97 3.47 2.40
[1.82] [0.39] [3.18] [1.02] [-0.05] [2.01] [2.22] [1.87] [3.32] [3.27]
Short -3.45 -4.47 -3.71 -4.01 -8.20 -6.14 -4.77 -4.25 -2.28 -4.59
[-1.99] [-2.68] [-1.61] [-2.22] [-3.27] [-3.43] [-2.99] [-2.28] [-0.90] [-3.76]
Long-Short 7.16 5.07 7.87 5.33 8.09 10.04 7.33 6.22 5.75 6.98
[2.72] [2.39] [2.69] [2.49] [2.05] [3.53] [3.94] [2.93] [2.08] [5.04]
Panel B: AMFs
Long 1.28 -0.49 4.23 1.26 0.67 4.76 1.66 1.80 4.30 2.16
[0.92] [-0.73] [2.90] [0.94] [0.59] [2.60] [1.42] [1.88] [3.63] [2.97]
Short -1.72 -3.79 -3.51 -3.32 -5.78 -6.29 -3.50 -0.36 -1.11 -3.28
[-1.55] [-2.49] [-1.50] [-1.79] [-1.94] [-3.47] [-2.32] [-0.21] [-0.49] [-2.98]
Long-Short 2.99 3.29 7.74 4.58 6.46 11.05 5.17 2.17 5.41 5.44
[1.89] [2.16] [2.86] [2.07] [1.99] [3.93] [2.79] [1.46] [1.77] [4.30]
Panel C: Correlations
ACC AG GP ITA MOM NOA NSI OSC ROA
ACC 1.00
(1.000)
AG 0.18
(0.000)
GP -0.15 0.23
(0.003) (0.000)
ITA 0.17 0.29 0.09
(0.001) (0.000) (0.085)
MOM 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.08
(0.036) (0.016) (0.066) (0.095)
NOA 0.36 0.32 0.08 0.35 0.25
(0.000) (0.000) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000)
NSI -0.01 0.24 0.21 0.31 0.00 0.27
(0.788) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.980) (0.000)
OSC 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.14
(0.657) (0.555) (0.000) (0.459) (0.176) (0.012) (0.004)
ROA -0.17 0.12 0.41 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.40 1.00
(0.001) (0.013) (0.000) (0.603) (0.000) (0.237) (0.002) (0.000) (1.000)
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Table 2. Characteristics of alternative mutual funds and stocks held
This table presents summary statistics of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) and the stocks they hold during the
sample period of 2002–2016. Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation, and the quantile distribution of
fund characteristics, including fund total net assets (TNA), age (AGE), turnover ratio (TURN), and annual
expense ratio (EXPENSE). Panel B presents the time-series averages of characteristic rank scores of (1) the CRSP
portfolio which consists of all stocks with non-missing characteristics in the CRSP universe, (2) the long
portfolio which includes all stocks long by AMFs, and (3) the short portfolio which contains all stock shorted by
AMFs, as well as the differences among the three portfolios. The characteristic rank score is the stock’s decile
rank on the characteristic relative to all stocks in the CRSP portfolio, with decile 10 (1) being the best- (worst-)
performing stocks. The portfolio-level characteristic rank score is thus the market-capitalization weighted
average rank score of all stocks held in the portfolio. The last row (AVG) refers to the mean values across the 11
stock characteristics, including book-to-market (BM), size (SIZE), and the nine anomalies studied in this paper.
Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.
Panel A: Fund characteristics
Quantile Distribution
Mean StdDev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
TNA ($mil) 245.38 623.17 5.14 12.21 41.00 158.88 685.51
AGE (years) 6.70 6.04 1.33 2.58 5.00 9.00 14.25
TURN (%) 297.83 650.55 49.50 100.07 182.47 319.80 517.60
EXPENSE (%) 1.95 0.55 1.36 1.60 1.90 2.24 2.65
Panel B: Stock characteristics
CRSP
AMFs
DifferenceLong Shorted
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (1) (3) - (1) (2) - (3)
ACC 5.67 5.79 5.68 0.12 [3.26] 0.01 [0.34] 0.11 [2.27]
AG 5.22 5.11 5.14 -0.10 [-2.12] -0.08 [-2.04] -0.02 [-0.35]
BM 3.95 3.74 3.57 -0.21 [-4.16] -0.38 [-7.61] 0.17 [2.06]
GP 5.76 5.97 5.78 0.22 [6.48] 0.02 [0.34] 0.20 [2.42]
ITA 5.43 5.48 5.33 0.05 [1.44] -0.10 [-2.91] 0.15 [2.89]
MOM 5.68 5.78 5.19 0.10 [1.73] -0.49 [-7.55] 0.59 [6.83]
NOA 5.73 6.01 5.74 0.27 [13.21] 0.01 [0.18] 0.27 [5.10]
NSI 6.93 7.26 6.97 0.33 [8.57] 0.04 [0.91] 0.29 [4.22]
OSC 7.81 8.60 7.84 0.80 [50.23] 0.03 [0.79] 0.77 [14.72]
ROA 7.18 7.71 7.00 0.53 [35.28] -0.18 [-5.02] 0.71 [18.17]
SIZE 1.56 1.14 1.32 -0.42 [-54.83] -0.24 [-18.38] -0.17 [-10.64]
AVG 5.54 5.69 5.41 0.15 [9.80] -0.12 [-9.49] 0.28 [11.22]
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Table 3. Alternative mutual funds’ trading on market anomalies
This table presents trading activity of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) on the nine stock market anomalies over the sample period of 2002–2016. We measure trading using two measures: (1)∆%Fund,
defined as the annualized change (in percentage) in the number of AMFs scaled by the average number of AMFs holding stocks in the same market capitalization decile at the beginning of the trading
window; and (2)∆%Shr, defined as the annualized change (in percentage) in fraction of shares held by AMFs. Both measures are calculated over a trading window of six quarters prior to the anomaly
portfolio formation date. "Underpriced" ("Overpriced") refers to the top (bottom) 30% stocks ranked by the indicated anomaly variable, and "Neutral" corresponds to the middle 40%. Panels A and B
show the results based on AMF’s long and short equity positions, respectively. In both panels, we compute the mean values across the nine anomalies in the last section ("AVG"). Figures in brackets are
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.
Panel A: Long stocks
ACC AG GP ITA MOM
%Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr
Underpriced 39.26 0.21 32.85 0.28 34.40 0.10 37.91 0.29 40.90 0.14
Neutral 35.30 0.10 33.80 0.11 35.15 0.18 33.95 0.12 24.98 0.12
Overpriced 26.58 0.17 35.22 0.09 32.73 0.14 30.52 0.08 13.74 0.08
U-N 3.96 [2.36] 0.11 [1.04] -0.95 [-0.56] 0.17 [1.31] -0.75 [-0.63] -0.09 [-1.21] 3.96 [3.80] 0.17 [1.22] 15.92 [17.96] 0.02 [0.48]
O-N -8.72 [-3.33] 0.07 [1.18] 1.42 [0.61] -0.03 [-1.32] -2.42 [-1.61] -0.04 [-0.48] -3.43 [-2.58] -0.05 [-2.07] -11.24 [-12.86] -0.04 [-1.48]
U-O 12.68 [6.52] 0.04 [0.36] -2.37 [-0.71] 0.20 [1.52] 1.67 [1.01] -0.04 [-0.73] 7.39 [4.03] 0.21 [1.58] 27.15 [18.92] 0.06 [1.82]
NOA NSI OSC ROA AVG
%Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr
Underpriced 36.83 0.26 33.44 0.21 30.01 0.08 31.16 0.06 38.02 0.20
Neutral 34.52 0.09 33.38 0.12 24.92 0.08 25.73 0.08 33.83 0.11
Overpriced 31.46 0.15 36.17 0.09 21.44 0.24 18.44 0.26 29.78 0.16
U-N 2.31 [1.52] 0.16 [1.29] 0.06 [0.03] 0.09 [1.13] 5.10 [7.06] 0.00 [-0.22] 5.43 [5.74] -0.01 [-2.19] 4.19 [4.33] 0.09 [1.33]
O-N -3.06 [-2.24] 0.06 [1.08] 2.79 [1.27] -0.03 [-1.40] -3.48 [-2.79] 0.16 [2.03] -7.29 [-8.88] 0.18 [2.18] -4.06 [-4.36] 0.05 [1.15]
U-O 5.37 [3.60] 0.11 [0.75] -2.73 [-1.50] 0.12 [1.49] 8.58 [5.15] -0.17 [-2.05] 12.72 [8.23] -0.19 [-2.36] 8.24 [5.60] 0.04 [0.96]
Panel B: Shorted stocks
ACC AG GP ITA MOM
%Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr
Underpriced 14.63 0.05 11.92 0.05 14.79 0.05 11.58 0.04 7.42 0.03
Neutral 14.23 0.04 13.84 0.04 14.85 0.05 14.01 0.04 11.03 0.04
Overpriced 22.17 0.08 24.10 0.07 19.85 0.06 23.46 0.07 17.09 0.07
U-N 0.41 [0.31] 0.01 [2.21] -1.92 [-2.03] 0.01 [1.09] -0.06 [-0.07] 0.01 [0.82] -2.43 [-2.29] 0.00 [-0.45] -3.61 [-4.41] -0.01 [-2.73]
O-N 7.94 [5.64] 0.03 [4.05] 10.26 [6.70] 0.03 [2.48] 5.00 [4.51] 0.01 [1.99] 9.44 [6.38] 0.03 [3.80] 6.06 [8.32] 0.04 [9.01]
U-O -7.53 [-3.93] -0.03 [-3.42] -12.18 [-6.78] -0.02 [-1.28] -5.05 [-3.49] -0.01 [-0.94] -11.87 [-8.48] -0.03 [-2.99] -9.67 [-8.13] -0.05 [-7.33]
NOA NSI OSC ROA AVG
%Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr %Fund %Shr
Underpriced 16.79 0.06 11.84 0.04 9.58 0.03 9.80 0.03 12.95 0.04
Neutral 13.22 0.04 15.18 0.05 11.91 0.04 10.78 0.04 14.36 0.05
Overpriced 20.38 0.06 24.49 0.07 16.22 0.07 17.65 0.08 22.70 0.07
U-N 3.57 [3.31] 0.01 [1.86] -3.35 [-2.97] -0.01 [-3.23] -2.32 [-4.86] -0.01 [-5.33] -0.98 [-1.72] 0.00 [-1.84] -1.41 [-3.17] 0.00 [-0.52]
O-N 7.16 [5.48] 0.02 [2.04] 9.31 [4.64] 0.01 [1.45] 4.32 [6.81] 0.02 [5.66] 6.87 [8.86] 0.04 [7.90] 8.34 [8.15] 0.03 [4.65]
U-O -3.60 [-2.63] -0.01 [-0.82] -12.65 [-5.58] -0.03 [-3.27] -6.64 [-8.50] -0.04 [-7.93] -7.85 [-8.23] -0.04 [-8.29] -9.76 [-7.98] -0.03 [-4.35]
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Table 4. Alternative mutual funds’ trading and abnormal anomaly returns
This table presents annualized three-factor alphas (in percentage) of anomaly portfolios conditional on alternative mutual funds (AMFs)’ trading during the sample period of 2002–2016. We measure
trading by∆%Fund, defined as the change in fraction of AMFs over the six-quarter trading window prior to anomaly portfolio formation date. Panels A and B report the results based on AMFs’ long and
short equity positions, respectively. In each panel, we construct four value-weighted conditional anomaly portfolios for each of the nine anomalies by taking the intersection of the top and bottom 30% of
the indicated anomaly variable with the top and bottom 20% of∆%Fund. We also construct four portfolios that take equal positions across the nine anomalies in the last section (“AVG”). “Underpriced”
(“Overpriced”) refers to the top (bottom) 30% stocks ranked by the anomaly variable. “Buy” (“Sell”) and “Short-sell” (“Cover”) refer to the top (bottom) 20% stocks ranked by∆%Fund for those held long
and sold short by AMFs, respectively. The alpha is estimated by regressing portfolio monthly excess returns from July of year t to June of year t+1 on the Fama and French (1993) three factors. Figures in
brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.
Panel A: Long stocks
ACC AG GP ITA MOM
Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference
Underpriced 0.32 1.28 -0.96 2.51 2.77 -0.26 3.70 0.80 2.90 4.34 3.11 1.23 1.26 1.83 -0.57
[0.11] [0.39] [-0.25] [1.25] [1.18] [-0.08] [1.24] [0.32] [0.74] [1.84] [1.08] [0.33] [0.47] [0.64] [-0.15]
Overpriced -4.71 1.48 -6.19 4.22 -0.50 4.72 -2.95 1.33 -4.28 7.66 0.06 7.61 4.01 2.69 1.32
[-1.32] [0.50] [-1.35] [1.26] [-0.18] [1.16] [-0.98] [0.46] [-1.18] [2.43] [0.02] [1.51] [0.94] [0.85] [0.28]
NOA NSI OSC ROA AVG
Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference
Underpriced 5.76 -1.02 6.79 2.05 2.28 -0.23 6.40 3.00 3.40 6.33 4.59 1.74 3.15 2.37 0.78
[2.07] [-0.46] [1.98] [0.90] [1.05] [-0.06] [2.49] [1.32] [0.92] [2.41] [2.05] [0.48] [1.96] [1.55] [0.32]
Overpriced -5.32 -0.76 -4.56 3.13 0.33 2.80 -2.41 -2.56 0.15 -9.87 -8.10 -1.77 -1.31 -0.32 -0.99
[-1.92] [-0.22] [-1.09] [0.84] [0.11] [0.56] [-0.81] [-0.92] [0.04] [-2.67] [-2.39] [-0.40] [-0.67] [-0.15] [-0.40]
Panel B: Shorted stocks
ACC AG GP ITA MOM
Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference
Underpriced -2.46 2.13 -4.58 1.38 1.57 -0.19 -1.38 1.12 -2.50 -6.47 2.60 -9.07 -2.20 2.29 -4.49
[-0.72] [0.76] [-1.27] [0.38] [0.62] [-0.04] [-0.47] [0.46] [-0.67] [-1.75] [1.39] [-2.29] [-0.65] [1.02] [-1.30]
Overpriced -4.74 0.22 -4.96 -2.82 3.33 -6.15 -1.82 -3.02 1.20 -4.79 -0.15 -4.64 -0.83 6.41 -7.24
[-2.04] [0.07] [-1.30] [-1.40] [1.19] [-2.00] [-0.63] [-1.07] [0.33] [-1.73] [-0.05] [-1.34] [-0.27] [2.41] [-2.02]
NOA NSI OSC ROA AVG
Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference
Underpriced 0.15 1.27 -1.12 -3.36 1.18 -4.54 -2.72 2.72 -5.44 -2.87 5.23 -8.10 -2.09 2.28 -4.37
[0.05] [0.58] [-0.30] [-1.15] [0.70] [-1.30] [-1.09] [1.50] [-1.79] [-1.10] [2.65] [-2.59] [-1.21] [1.85] [-2.09]
Overpriced -5.16 -4.37 -0.79 -5.28 4.38 -9.66 -3.99 3.51 -7.50 -5.33 -3.95 -1.38 -3.80 1.17 -4.96
[-2.11] [-1.31] [-0.26] [-2.19] [1.23] [-2.19] [-1.53] [1.30] [-2.01] [-1.70] [-1.24] [-0.35] [-2.19] [0.67] [-2.53]
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Table 5. Characteristics of anomaly portfolios conditional on alternative mutual funds’ trading
This table presents average characteristics across the nine anomalies of stocks held in anomaly portfolios conditional on alternative mutual funds (AMFs)’ trading over the sample
period of 2002–2016. We measure trading by∆%Fund, defined as the change in fraction of AMFs over the six-quarter trading window prior to anomaly portfolio formation date. Panels
A and B report the results based on AMFs’ long and short equity positions, respectively. In each panel, we construct four value-weighted conditional anomaly portfolios for each of the
nine anomalies by taking the intersection of the top and bottom 30% of the anomaly variable with the top and bottom 20% of∆%Fund. “Underpriced” (“Overpriced”) refers to the top
(bottom) 30% stocks ranked by the anomaly variable. “Buy” (“Sell”) and “Short-sell” (“Cover”) refer to the top (bottom) 20% stocks ranked by∆%Fund for those held long and sold short
by AMFs, respectively. %NSTOCKS is the count of stocks in each portfolio divided by the total number of stocks in the four portfolios. MKTCAP is the average market capitalization in
millions 2016 dollars. BM is the average book-to-market ratio. TURN is the average monthly turnover ratio over the previous year. IVOL is the average annualized volatility of monthly
residuals from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model estimated over the past 36 months. Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.
%NSTOCKS (%) MKTCAP (in 2016 $Mil) BM TURN (%) IVOL (%)
Panel A: Long stocks
Buy Sell B-S Buy Sell B-S Buy Sell B-S Buy Sell B-S Buy Sell B-S
Underpriced 35.16 18.58 16.57 13,299.93 6,052.85 7,247.08 0.50 0.52 -0.02 24.31 24.42 -0.11 33.68 33.87 -0.19
[8.84] [3.40] [-0.88] [-0.13] [-0.18]
Overpriced 25.57 20.69 4.87 7,759.68 4,165.85 3,593.83 0.58 0.62 -0.04 25.53 27.17 -1.63 36.50 37.00 -0.50
[2.69] [2.60] [-1.68] [-1.75] [-0.47]
Panel B: Shorted stocks
Short-sell Cover S-C Short-sell Cover S-C Short-sell Cover S-C Short-sell Cover S-C Short-sell Cover S-C
Underpriced 24.69 22.45 2.24 7,439.62 10,349.57 -2,909.94 0.41 0.46 -0.04 28.43 24.32 4.11 37.02 27.36 8.45
[1.50] [-1.60] [-4.39] [4.61] [6.90]
Overpriced 34.56 18.30 16.26 3,990.49 6,203.67 -2,213.19 0.47 0.56 -0.09 30.24 26.66 3.58 40.38 31.05 7.59
[8.55] [-3.28] [-4.97] [6.16] [5.40]
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Table 6. Alternative mutual funds’ trading and future stock returns
This table reports Fama-McBeth regression results of monthly stock excess returns on alternative mutual funds (AMFs)’ trading
and a variety of stock characteristics over the sample period of 2002:7–2016:12. We measure trading by∆%Fund, defined as the
change in fraction of AMFs over the six-, four-, two-, or one-quarter trading window prior to the anomaly portfolio formation
date. In Columns (1)–(4), we regress excess returns on∆%Fund only. Columns (5)–(8) control for firm size (SIZE) and
book-to-market ratio (BM), and Columns (9)–(12) further control for the nine anomaly characteristics. Panels A and B present the
results based on stocks held long and sold short by AMFs, respectively. Figures in brackets are Newey-West adjusted t-statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Long stocks
∆%Fund(q-6, q-1) -0.33 -0.05 -0.06
[-2.38] [-1.59] [-0.88]
∆%Fund(q-4, q-1) -0.19 -0.09 -0.06
[-2.08] [-1.12] [-1.06]
∆%Fund(q-2, q-1) -0.10 -0.06 -0.04
[-1.76] [-1.31] [-1.20]
∆%Fund(q-1) -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
[-0.81] [-1.06] [-0.26]
SIZE -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18
[-3.46] [-3.42] [-3.46] [-3.49] [-5.49] [-5.57] [-5.38] [-5.07]
BM 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.09
[0.29] [0.31] [0.20] [0.35] [0.27] [0.20] [0.19] [0.48]
ACC 0.29 0.28 0.17 0.14
[0.38] [0.36] [0.23] [0.18]
AG 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06
[0.53] [0.51] [0.35] [0.32]
GP -0.63 -0.61 -0.61 -0.59
[-2.25] [-2.20] [-2.15] [-2.05]
ITA 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.12
[0.18] [0.21] [0.31] [0.23]
MOM -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.79
[-2.04] [-2.03] [-2.01] [-2.00]
NOA 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.41
[2.17] [2.01] [1.93] [2.11]
NSI -0.32 -0.28 -0.18 -0.23
[-0.63] [-0.55] [-0.34] [-0.42]
OSC 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09
[1.99] [1.97] [1.96] [1.76]
ROA 14.18 14.01 14.18 14.58
[7.29] [7.17] [7.03] [7.28]
Panel B: Shorted stocks
∆%Fund(q-6, q-1) -0.37 -0.27 -0.12
[-2.45] [-2.06] [-0.83]
∆%Fund(q-4, q-1) -0.21 -0.15 -0.07
[-1.93] [-1.51] [-0.26]
∆%Fund(q-2, q-1) -0.06 -0.02 -0.01
[-1.00] [-0.34] [-0.12]
∆%Fund(q-1) -0.08 -0.05 -0.07
[-2.30] [-1.30] [-1.69]
SIZE -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
[-2.24] [-2.25] [-2.29] [-2.30] [-3.81] [-3.82] [-3.81] [-3.86]
BM 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05
[0.17] [0.15] [0.15] [0.10] [-0.17] [-0.26] [-0.13] [-0.22]
ACC 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.17
[0.39] [0.45] [0.40] [0.22]
AG 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.07
[0.49] [0.63] [0.59] [0.39]
GP -0.61 -0.62 -0.62 -0.60
[-1.97] [-2.00] [-2.02] [-1.89]
ITA 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.15
[0.20] [0.26] [0.21] [0.30]
MOM -0.81 -0.79 -0.78 -0.77
[-1.99] [-1.94] [-1.88] [-1.87]
NOA 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.30
[1.99] [1.82] [2.03] [1.81]
NSI 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.23
[0.04] [-0.03] [0.15] [0.44]
OSC 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
[2.26] [2.43] [2.54] [2.45]
ROA 9.31 8.97 8.72 8.16
[4.12] [4.03] [4.17] [3.97]
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Table 7. Anomaly trading and performance of conditional anomaly portfolios by fund category
This table presents anomaly trading activity of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) and abnomal returns of anomaly portfolios conditional on AMFs’ trading by fund category in Panels A and B, respectively,
during the sample period of 2002–2016. Our sample consists of five fund categories as classified by Morningstar: Long-short Equity, Market Neutral, Multialternative, 130–30, and Bear Market. For each fund
category, we report the results averaged across the nine anomalies. In Panel A, We measure trading by∆%Fund, defined as the change in fraction of AMFs over the six-quarter trading window prior to the
anomaly portfolio formation date. In Panel B, we construct four value-weighted conditional anomaly portfolios by taking the intersection of the top and bottom 30% of the anomaly variable with the top and
bottom 20% of∆%Fund, and calculate annualized three-factor alphas (in percentage) of these portfolios. “Underpriced” (“Overpriced”) refers to the top (bottom) 30% stocks ranked by the anomaly variable,
and "Neutral" corresponds to the middle 40%. “Buy” (“Sell”) and “Short-sell” (“Cover”) refer to the top (bottom) 20% stocks ranked by∆%Fund for those held long and sold short by AMFs, respectively.
Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics.
Long-short Equity Market Neutral Multialternative 130-30 Bear Market
Panel A: Anomaly trading
A1. Long stocks
∆%Fund ∆%Fund ∆%Fund ∆%Fund
Underpriced 11.27 12.65 7.16 6.57
Neutral 10.71 10.85 6.64 5.38
Overpriced 8.70 10.78 6.38 4.50
U-N 0.56 [1.28] 1.80 [3.21] 0.52 [3.37] 1.19 [1.62]
O-N -2.01 [-3.40] -0.07 [-0.08] -0.27 [-0.95] -0.88 [-1.98]
U-O 2.57 [5.08] 1.87 [2.83] 0.79 [2.39] 2.06 [3.17]
A2. Shorted stocks
∆%Fund ∆%Fund ∆%Fund ∆%Fund ∆%Fund
Underpriced 4.70 4.18 2.45 0.37 0.62
Neutral 4.45 4.68 2.58 0.48 0.69
Overpriced 7.06 7.79 3.24 1.52 0.41
U-N 0.25 [1.11] -0.50 [-1.98] -0.14 [-1.33] -0.11 [-0.74] -0.07 [-0.19]
O-N 2.61 [6.39] 3.11 [5.78] 0.66 [2.55] 1.04 [2.36] -0.29 [-1.15]
U-O -2.35 [-5.56] -3.61 [-8.30] -0.80 [-2.53] -1.15 [-2.12] 0.22 [0.78]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
B1. Long stocks
Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference Buy Sell Difference
Underpriced 1.41 1.88 -0.47 2.70 -1.81 4.51 0.17 3.30 -3.14 1.77 -0.18 1.95
[0.78] [0.82] [-0.19] [1.40] [-1.00] [2.03] [0.09] [1.20] [-0.94] [1.60] [-0.11] [0.91]
Overpriced -2.47 -5.86 3.39 -1.29 1.79 -3.08 -1.58 1.55 -3.13 0.24 -3.72 3.96
[-0.94] [-1.54] [0.73] [-0.53] [0.76] [-1.19] [-0.65] [0.58] [-0.91] [0.16] [-1.40] [1.38]
B2. Shorted stocks
Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference Short-sell Cover Difference
Underpriced -0.10 5.48 -5.58 2.78 2.72 0.06 1.78 0.54 1.24 -1.74 1.30 -3.05 -0.66 4.33 -5.00
[-0.04] [2.78] [-2.51] [1.04] [1.51] [0.02] [0.58] [0.23] [0.31] [-0.53] [0.59] [-0.84] [-0.17] [2.24] [-1.19]
Overpriced -5.04 -0.49 -4.54 -4.97 -0.27 -4.70 -4.23 -1.31 -2.92 -1.49 -6.45 4.96 -7.29 0.68 -7.97
[-2.31] [-0.50] [-2.06] [-2.75] [-0.32] [-2.29] [-1.61] [-0.50] [-0.96] [-0.50] [-1.79] [1.24] [-1.72] [0.25] [-1.77]
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Table 8. Anomaly trading and performance of conditional anomaly portfolios in
sub-periods
This table presents anomaly trading activity of alternative mutual funds (AMFs) and abnomal
returns of anomaly portfolios conditional on AMFs’ trading in Panels A and B, respectively,
during the two sub-periods of 2002:7–2009:6 and 2009:7–2016:12. For each sub-period, we
report the results averaged across the nine anomalies based on stocks held long and sold short
by AMFs separately. In Panel A, We measure trading by∆%Fund, defined as the change in
fraction of AMFs over the six-quarter trading window prior to the anomaly portfolio
formation date. In Panel B, we construct four value-weighted conditional anomaly portfolios
by taking the intersection of the top and bottom 30% of the anomaly variable with the top and
bottom 20% of∆%Fund, and calculate annualized three-factor alphas (in percentage) of these
portfolios. “Underpriced” (“Overpriced”) refers to the top (bottom) 30% stocks ranked by the
anomaly variable, and "Neutral" corresponds to the middle 40%. “Buy” (“Sell”) and
“Short-sell” (“Cover”) refer to the top (bottom) 20% stocks ranked by∆%Fund for those held
long and sold short by AMFs, respectively. Figures in brackets are heteroskedasticity-adjusted
t-statistics.
Long stocks Shorted stocks
Panel A: Anomaly trading
A1. 2002:7–2009:6
%Fund %Fund
Underpriced 51.77 17.96
Neutral 46.47 20.76
Overpriced 39.99 31.56
U-N 5.31 [2.63] -2.80 [-3.48]
O-N -6.48 [-4.25] 10.80 [11.71]
U-O 11.79 [4.70] -13.60 [-13.96]
A2. 2009:7–2016:12
%Fund %Fund
Underpriced 25.99 9.81
Neutral 22.78 10.36
Overpriced 20.85 17.17
U-N 3.21 [7.63] -0.55 [-2.62]
O-N -1.93 [-5.56] 6.81 [5.16]
U-O 5.14 [7.60] -7.36 [-5.67]
Panel B: Abnormal returns
B1. 2002:7–2009:6
Buy Sell Difference Short-sell Cover Difference
Underpriced 2.78 3.22 -0.44 -2.81 0.13 -2.94
[1.47] [1.20] [-0.12] [-1.06] [0.06] [-0.92]
Overpriced 0.98 0.94 0.05 -0.96 6.37 -7.33
[0.32] [0.21] [0.01] [-0.63] [2.07] [-2.81]
B2. 2009:7–2016:12
Buy Sell Difference Short-sell Cover Difference
Underpriced 2.18 2.97 -0.79 -1.28 3.26 -4.53
[0.92] [1.86] [-0.27] [-0.50] [2.76] [-2.14]
Overpriced -3.18 0.62 -3.80 -4.48 -1.36 -3.12
[-1.49] [0.32] [-1.43] [-2.52] [-0.58] [-2.17]
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